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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY MACISHARA, a minor, 
by his Guardian, 
BUR'l' 8. MACSHARA, JR., 
vs. 
RULON ROY GARFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
~ATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Jury verdict in favor of 
the defendant. Plaintiff requests the Court for an Order 
granting a new trial wherein he is permitted: 
(a) 'l'o introduce expert testimony regarding re-
construction of accident, speed of vehicles, 
course of vehicles after impact. 
( b) To have the Court instruct the Jury on the 
Law applicable to plaintiff's theory of the 
case. 
( c) To exclude improperly admitted evidence and 
witnesses. 
~TATJ<J~1ENT OF THE MATERIAL FACT8 
Plaintiff was involved in an accident with the de-
fendant on Sunday, August 23, 1964, at about 7 :15 p.m. 
(Tr. 11-U) The accident occurred at the intersection of 
NhPridan Drive and Tyler Avenue in Ogden, Utah (TR. 
11 ) . Both streets are hard-surfaced. Tyler runs generally 
north and south and Sheridan runs generally east and 
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west ( '11r. 11). For all pmposec; the interneetion ic; a 
right angle intersection (TR. 11). There were no traffic-
control devices at said intersection (Tr. 131). The de-
fendant was driving a l\lercury automobile west on Sher-
idan Drive, (Tr. 13) his wife was a passenger, (Tr. 13). 
The plaintiff was driving south on Tyler in a Falcon 
automobile (Tr. 15). The accident was investigated by , 
Officer David Reed of the Ogden City Police Department 
who prepared plaintiff's Exhibit "E", being a detailed 
sketch of the physical findings observed at the scene of 
the accident. He was assisted by 1Captain Alvin Foulger 
of the Ogden City Police Department. There were no eye 
witnesses to the accident. A Patricia l\lorgan heard the 
impact, looked up and saw the automobile of the plain-
tiff go end for end in a horizontal plane (Tr. 39). The 
defendant told three different stories as to his speed 
and the facts of the accident as follows: 
(a) That he did not see plaintiff's vehicle except 
out of the corner of his eye until immediately prior to 
impact (Tr. 49). 
(b) On deposition February 5, 1965, the defendant 
stated that the plaintiff's car was some two or three 
carlengths north of the intersection at the time defen-
dant entered the intersection and that the average car ' 
is 16 to 18 feet long (Tr. 19-20). 
( c) At trial the defendant contended that at the 
time his vehicle was four to five feet in the intersection 
the plaintiff was 75 feet north of the intersection (Tr. 
15). That at that time the defendant was driving 2U to 
25 miles an hour, (Tr. 14). 
The defendant's wife likewise had three versions of 
the facts: 
2 
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(a) Defendant's wife told Officer Reed on the 
:.'.(ith day of August, 19G..t that she didn't see the plain-
tiff's car until impact. (Tr. 23-24). 
( b) Defendant's wife, on September 9, 196±, stated 
that she saw the car prior to impact and that the plain-
tiff was looking straight ahead and she had no estimte 
as to where the car was. (Tr. 23-24) 
( c) Defendant's wife, at the time of trial testified 
that she saw plaintiff's vehicle as they "ntered the inter-
section going 20 miles an hour (Tr. 403) and that the 
plaintiff's car was 1..tO feet north of the intersection. 
(Tr. -±05) 
rl'he plaintiff recalls stopping at the Trinity Pres-
byterian 'Church which was some 682 feet from the 
intersection (Tr. -±48). He has no recollection of the 
impact except for isolated exerpts (Tr. 222). Dr. Rich-
ard S. Iverson testified that plaintiff had a concussion 
as a result of the accident and suffered retrograde am-
nesia. (Tr. 179) 
The passenger in plaintiff's vehicle stated that at 
the time that the llfacShara vehicle entered the inter-
~ection defendant's vehicle was 40 feet up the road to 
the east. (Tr. 170) 
Neither the defendant nor his wife claim to have 
t>topped or yield the right of way to the plaintiff. 
ri'he plaintiff suffered 20% permanent partial use 
of tlw entire skeleton (Tr. 76). 
POINT I. 
THI~ COURT ~RRED IN REFUSING TO AD.MIT 
l'~XPERT rrESTIMONY RELATIVE TO RECON-
Nrl'HUCTlON OF TH~ ACCIDENT, AS TO THE 
3 
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~PEED Olj' 'l'llE Vl~lllCLES A'l' IMP _A,CT, WHAT 
HAPPEKED AT 'l'llE POI?-;T OF DlPACT, Al\'"D 
WHAT IlAPPl~NED TO 'I'lIE YEIIICLES AF'l'ER 
IMPACT. 
Captain Alvin \V. Foulger was called as an l'Xtwrt 
witness by the plaintiff. He was found to be a qualified 
expert (Tr. 251) by the comt. Ill• has been in the 'l'raffa 
Division since 19-±7, (Tr. 2-H) he has received training 
at the Northwestern Traffic Institute at Evanston II-
' linois; (Tr. 213) he took special courses at Weber Col-
lege, and attended refresher courses put on by the 
Utah Peace Officers and the Utah Safety Council and 
he taught traffic investigation to all young· police officen 
of Ogden City. 
He assisted ~Ir. Reed at the accident (Tr. 2-!5) and 
went back with him to re-examine the area ('l'r. 2-!6). He 
examined both cars and the damagl' thereon ( 'l'r. 2-!'i) 
and from them determined the point of impact of the two 
vehicles ( 'l'r. 252-253). He considered all of the physical 
evidence shown in Exhibit "E", considered the pavement, 
the gouge marks, the chipping of the cement (Tr. 260), 
the \Veight of the vehicles (Tr. 270-271). In addition, 
Captain Foulger stated that he had an opinion as to the 
coefficient of friction of the surfaced highway at the time 
and date of the accident, ('l'r. 279) reaction time (Tr. 
284-285). Counsel for the <lefendant objected on the basis 
that no proper foundation had been laid, ( 'l'r. 286) an<l 
for the reason that under the decision of the Utah Su-
preme Court case, Lorenzo Smith & Son vs. Day the 
proposed hypothetical questions were such that laymen 
of ordinary intelligence would not ne<'d any assistance. 
The defendant's objections to the expert testimony a~ 
hereinbefore subscribed were sustained. 
4 
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As the fads indicate there was no question that 
the d('frndant did not stop and/or yield to the plaintiff. 
The sole question is, was he excused from so stopping 
or yielding to the plaintiff by reason of the speed of the 
defendant's car and that he entered the intersection 
whPn the plaintiff was some distance up the street. 
There were no eye witnesses to this accident and 
the prime question in this appeal is whether or not the 
problem of speed and course of the vehicles was the 
subject of expert testimony. 
Plaintiff attempted to reconstruct the accident to 
show: 
(a) Plaintiff was driving within the speed limit at 
the time of impact. 
( b) That the defendant was traveling substantially 
in excess of the speed limit.. 
( c) The effect the speed of the defendant had on 
the course of plaintiff's vehicle after impact. 
It is submitted, by the overwhelming weight of 
authorities in Utah and the United States, the testimony 
was admissible and should have been received. 
There are numerous cases in Utah on expert testi-
mony. Probably the first of any consequence is that of 
t:Jtate vs. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91 P2d, 457. This was 
a manslaughter case and the State had an expert testify 
as to speed, based upon tire marks of a skidding vehicle. 
The testimony was deemed admissible by the Supreme 
Court even though it was on an ultimate fact. The Court 
further held that omissions of alleged material facts in 
a hypothetical question was not a basis for elimination 
of the testimony, but rather it afforded an opportunity 
5 
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for cross examination and aro·urnent to the Jury on th~ 
0 • 
part of that party against whom the te8tirnony was of-
fen~d. See: Morby v Rogers, 252 P2d 201; Alvarado r 
Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16; 268 P2d 986; and 1-i olmes v N el-
s on, 7 Utah 2d 435; 326 P2d 722. The first time that 
the problem of admissibility of such testimony was 
expressly authorized was that of Gittens v Lundberg, 
3 Utah 2d 398; 284 P2d 1115, where the Court said: 
The final indictment plaintiff levels against the 
proceeding below is that error was committed in 
permitting Mr. Lowe, the investigating officer, 
to give his opinion of the speed of the defendant's 
car based on skid marks, the objection being that 
he was not qualified to make such deduction. The 
witness was an experienced officer; had served as 
marshal of Smithfield for over eleven years; had 
investigated many traffic accidents and made tests 
as to braking and stopping distances. On the basi11 
of his experience and the use of a pre-computed 
chart which is in general use throughout the coun-
try he was properly allowed to give his opinion 
as to the speed of the car as about 20 miles per 
hour. -we have previously approved the admis-
sion of testimony similar in character. 
Thus, it will be seen that for many years it has been 
held in Utah, First, that speed could be determined from 
skid marks, and Second, that speed as computed by the 
expert officer was not such a matter a8 to come within 
the ordinary comprehension of a layman and was in fact 
admissible. This is all the plaintiff attempted to do here 
was to elicit the self same opinion of speed that tlw 
Supreme Court had already ruled was a subject of 
expert testimony. The only diffe1·ence in this ca8e was 
6 
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that the oprn10n of ::;peed wa:::; ba:oed on a great lllany 
more rather than less facts than the court had already 
rnnstituted was an adequate foundation. This tendered 
evidPnce was in accord \Yith the Utah decisions on ex-
pert testimony. Hooper v General Motors, 123 Utah 515; 
J(i0 P2d 5-±9, is the lead case in Utah relative to expert 
testimony. In that case the problem involved the rear 
wheel of a Chevrolet automobile which separated. The 
plaintiff contended and introduced expert testimony to 
tlw effect that this was caused by a defect in the manu-
facture of the wheel. The defendant produced expert 
testimony that the wheel had been struck an extremely 
lwavy blow which caused the accident. The testimony 
of the latter was objected to as going to the ultimate 
fact and issue which was solely for the jury to determine. 
ThP Comt disposed of this properly by saying: 
The modern tendency and the rule of this court is 
that an expert may give an opinion as to the cause 
of a particular occurrence or condition regardless 
of whether the cause of such occurrence or condi-
tion is in dispute and regardless of whether the 
jury must determine which of the causes urged by 
the respective parties is the correct one. 
The expert's opinion otherwise qualified is 
proper on the fact of "cause" whether such 
fact be labeled evidentiary, primary, recon-
ciled, inferential, or ultimate. 
From that date to this, the problem as to the question 
of whdher the testimony was on ultimate fact has been 
and now is dPhffmined to be immaterial in Utah. 
']1 h<> nPxt case in point was the Richards Estate, 5 
IT tah 2d 102, 259 P2d 53-±. In that case the Court had be-
7 
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fore it a problem of the rne11tnl capat'.ity of the tl'statr;x. 
Testimony was addueed from an expert who had not 
seen the decedent and who was therefore compelled to 
testify on the basis of testimony of other witnesses. The 
defendant objected to the testimony upon the basis that 
it did not include all of the testimony, one way or the 
other, and as a consequence the testimony could not be 
introduced. The Supreme Court held that where the facts 
were in dispute, hypothetical questions may be framed 
either on all facts of the case or on such facts as the 
party producing the expert may desire. '11he Court held 
that the absence of all the facts in a hypothetical question 
did not bar the testimony, but \YaS a proper basis for 
cross-examination and argument to the jury. The expert 
testimony was admitted and the opinion affirmed. In 
Joseph v L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P2d 330, the 
litigation involved a malpractice action, and over the 
objection of plaintiff the defendant was permitted to 
produce expert testimony of a nurse, that the dt>cedent 
had in fact received good nursing care. 'l1his was objected 
to again upon the basis that it vms ultimate fact that 
was to be determined by the Jury. Again the Supreme 
Court affirmed, saying in the vrnrds of the Hooper case, 
supra, that expert testimony can be introduced even 
though it be on an ultimate fact in issue. They added 
an amendment to the principal to the effect that such 
testimony will not be receivt>d if a layman of ordinary 
intellige~ce can equally determine what happened. This 
position was reaffirmed in Day v Lorenzo Smith arnd 
Son, Incorporated v Supreme Court Case No. 1023G, 
which involved an expert's testimony as to the point of 
impact. In this case, lwwever, the Supreme Court re-
jected the testimony stating: 
8 
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... we hold that it was enor to permit Sherwood's 
testimony as to the point of impact because his 
opinion was not supported by sufficient facts and, 
what meager facts he did testify to were not con-
nected up or related to his opinion. They were in-
adequate to support his conclusion. 
ThP overwhelming weight of authority in the United 
States provides that expert testimony as to speed based 
only upon an examination of the damages to the vehicles 
involved is admissible. See: Adams v Evans, 23 S.E. 2d 
507 reaffirmed, Georgia; Berkovitz v American River 
Grauel Comp.any, 215 P2d 675, California; Cobb v Cole-
man, 93 S.E. 2d 801, Georgia; Harrington v Travers, 
192 N.E. 495, Mass.; Pueblo v Ratcliff, 327 P2d 270, Col-
orado; Deniarais v Johnson, 3 P2d 283, Montana; Phoenix 
u Paul Refining Compamy, 251 S.W. 2d 892, Texas; 
Vurhopp v Brackhan, 164 Neb. 382, 82 N.W. 2d 557, 
Nebraska; Rubach v Prahl, 190 Wis. 421, 209 N.W. 670, 
Wisconsin; Kriens v McMillan, 42 S.D. 285, 173 N.W. 731, 
South Dakota; and Young v Fort, 109 N.W. 2d, 230, Iowa. 
The recent decisions tend to expand rather than con-
tract the admissibility of expert testimony. The case 
of Miller v Pillsbury Company, 206 N.E. 2d 272, 56 Ill. 
A pp. 2d -±03, best illustrates the trend in expert testi-
mony, particularly where there are no eye witnesses. In 
this case the Court permitted an expert to reconstruct the 
accident on the basis of the physical facts placed in evi-
dence, saying: 
We :;i,re of the persuasion that in a proper case, 
an expert should be permitted to give his opinion 
as to how an accident occurred, and to inf er out 
loud how the vehicles involved may have acted 
9 
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before, at the time of, and after an ael'ident. W1, 
agree with this statement from 10 Proof of Faet~ , 
imge 1±--1, "Reconstruction of Accidents": 
'The trend is to allow l'Xpert opinion testi-
mony reconstructing motor vellicle accidents 
from physical evidence, provided the expert 
witness is sufficiently qualified in the par-
ticular field, has before him ·with the impor-
tant variables involved, make.,; his reasoning 
process clear to the trier of fact, and provided 
his conclusion from the physical evidence is 
not contrary to those facts or 'in conflict with 
common observations and experiences of 
1nen.' 
In the MacShara case Captain Foulger was asked 
to reconstruct the accident and to tell the Jury what 
happened at the scene. Notwithstanding the fact that 
no authority was offered to the contrary the trial court 
refused to do what American ,Jurisprudence nnd the Illin-
ois Courts deemed entirley admissible. The decision ar-
rived at in Illinois was concurred in by Arizona to the 
effect that the opinion of an expert as to the point of 
impact, speed, etc., may Le admitted where it would be 
of some assistance to the Jury and even if the opinion 
was based solely on photographs. 
City of Phoenix v. Schroeder, 1 Ariz App 510, -1:05 
P2d 301 ( 1965), holding testimony of expert, 
Ralph Snyder, was properly admitted; judgment 
for plaintiffs AFFIR?IO~D. "Mr. Snyder recon-
structed the collision and testifi0d as to his opinion 
and conclusions about the point of impact and the 
speed of plaintiffs' automobile immediately prior 
10 
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to the impact, as well as other matters concerning 
the accident. .l'llr. :Snyder was also able to testify 
concerning the point of impact of the automobile 
involved in the second accident which occurred 
some 15 minutes after the first accident. His testi-
mony from photographs taken at the scene of the 
accident after the second accident appeared to 
ue most helpful in assisting the jury to determine 
where plaintiff Schroeder's truck had hit the boom 
truck and where the second car had hit the same 
truck almost immediately thereafter .... 
"Inasmuch as there was a second accident within 
15 minutes after the first accident, and there was 
some confusion among the witnesses as to exactly 
what happened, we think that the trial court did 
not err in admitting the testimony and opinions 
of Mr. Snyder in order to properly aid and assist 
the jury in arriving at a decision in this case." 
Finally, the state of Texas has held that an expert 
may testify as to the course of the vehicles involved in 
a collision subsequent to the point of impact.Mesa Truck-
111g Company v. King, 37G S.W. :2d 863 - in this case 
the Court stated, 
The next point appellants assert is that the trial 
court erred to the prejudice of appellants in over-
ruling their motion to instruct the jury not to 
consider for any purpose the testimony of the 
Deputy Sheriff, Olan Heath, as to the point of 
impact and the course the vehicles took after im-
pact. 
The statement of facts shows the trial court very 
carefully considered the objections made by ap-
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pellants before rnling. He made the observation 
that all parties agreed there was an impact, then 
stated "* * * he will be permitted to testify as to 
the opinion, if he can properly predicate it, and if 
this man has an opinion as to the impact, I will let 
it come in for whatever it may be worth." 
The officer then testified he had been a deputy 
sheriff in Yoakum County for :_•ight years; had 
been in such work for twenty-five years; that hi~ 
duties involved the patroling of highways and hP 
had investigated hundreds of accidents thereon. 
He said in effect, from those years of training 
in the many accidents he had worked, that by de-
termining the location of the physical evidence 
as he found it he could determine what happened. 
From the conditions at the scene, including the 
grain, debris, the location of the trucks before 
they were moved, three or four chipped out places 
about two inches deep on the highway on the south 
side of the center stripe and all other physical 
facts, he testified he could tell where the impact 
occurred; which direction each truck was moving; 
how far they proceeded; their direction after im-
pact; and which side of the road the vehicles were 
on when the impact occurred. The court had that 
testimony before him and the numerous photo-
graphs, several of which were greatly enlarged, 
upon which to base his ruling. 
The thoroughness with which the officer made his 
study, his diligence in marking the highway so 
he could observe it the next morning in the day-
light, and the measurements he made, we believe 
gave him knowledge beyond that of an average 
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layman and made it probable that his opm10n 
would be of assistance to the trier of the facts. 
California adopted the rational of the majority in 
Kastner v. Los Angeles JJlctropolitan Transit Authority, 
±03 P2d 38G where the Court again faced the contention 
that the expert could not testify unless he observed each 
and every fact upon which his opinion was based. The 
Court disposed of this, saying: 
The expert in any case proper for the reception 
of expert testimony may give his opinion although 
he did not personally observe the facts, basing 
his opinion upon the facts testified to by other 
witnesses and included in hypothetical questions 
put to him. If the case is one for expert testimony, 
this is so not because the expert has witnessed the 
facts, but because he is qualified by reason of his 
i:ipecial knowledge to form an opinion on the facts 
while the ordinary juror is not. (Manney v. Hous-
ing Authority of City of Richmond, 79 Cal. App. 
2d 453, 459-460 (3), 180 P2d 69 hearing denied by 
the Supreme Court). 
In 1965 Montana, in Boehler v Sanders, 404 P2d 885 
had a chance to review all of its decisions relative to the 
admissibility of expert testimony of police officers. In 
tio doing it considered the problem of whether the opinion 
invaded the province of the Jury as w<:>ll as whether it 
was necessary that the police officer actually witnessed 
the collision. This case, as in the MacShara case, involved 
tlw question of which car entered the .intersection first. 
Tlw Court permitted the introduction of the evidence 
of an expert traffic officer going to the point of which 
vehicle did enter the intersection first, saying: 
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Thi;-; Court ha;-; prt>viously lidd in a number of 
cast's that an expert or a skilled witm•;-;s can give 
an opinion upon facts previously testified to by 
him, but not on facts known to him, but not com-
municated to the court or jury. rrhe witness must 
testify as to the facts upon which he bases his 
opinion. Nesbitt v City of Butte, 118 Mont. 8±, 
92, 163 P2d 251; Irion v Hyde, 110 1\Iont. 570, 105 
P2d 666; 32 C.J.S. Evidence 4-±G, p. G4; 20 Arn. 
J ur. 793, p. GG5. For the foregoing reasons we 
find no merit to appellant's first two specifications 
of error. 
The following ;-;tates are in accord with the views 
heretofore expressed. Bell v Myrtle, 153 Atlantic 2d 313, 
District of Colmnbia ;Kerr v Carau·ay, 78 S2d 571, Rey-
nolds v A u.nent, 133 S2d 562, Florida; Dudik v Popp, 129 
N.\V. (2) 393, 1\Iichigan; Moeller v St. Paul City Railway 
Company, 1G N.\V. 2d 289, Storl1akken v Soderberg, 75 
N.W-. 2d 496, Minnesota,Flory v Holtz, 12G N.W. 2d 8±9, 
Oklahoma, Ferrnz.za v City of Pittsburg, 145 Atlantic 2d 
706, Pennsylvania, Wintzel v Huebner, 104 N.W. 2d 695, 
South Dakota, Mon day v Millsaps, 264, S.W. 2d 6, 
Thomas v Harper, 385 S.\V. 2d 130, Tennessee; Cross t 
Patches Estate, 178 Atlantic 2d 393, Vermont; Jll.G.C. 
Corporation v Henthorn, 83 N.W. 2d 759, \Visconsin; 
Adams v Evans, 23 S.E. 2d 507; reaffirmed in Cobb v 
Coleman, 93 S.E. 2d 801; Thornton v Gaillard, 111 Geo. 
App., 371; 1±1 S. E. 2d. 771, Georgia. 
Finally, New Mexico, in Lewis v. Knott, 504 P2d 
662, 75 N.M. 422, involved a case where the left front 
tire on a car being driven blew out. The driver lost control 
of the automobile and caused it to turn over several 
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times, causing the death of liis passenger, 1fanq Lewis . 
. \. di1w·t verdict was gra11tt>d at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case. 1'he plaintiff appealed contending that 
the Cum-t ened in l'efusing exrert te;:;timony of the speed 
oi' th<> automobile at the time of the accident. The de-
fendant contended that the testimony .,;hould have been 
e:;.cluded because it was based in part upon a critical 
curve speed and that such testimony could have no bear-
ing on the speed of the car before it went out of control. 
'rhe ~upreme Court of Kew :Mexico reversed the decision 
saying it was prejudicial enor to exclude this testimony. 
It is again interesting to note that there were no inde-
pendent eye witnesses to the accident and that the only 
evidence of speed was given by the survivor driver. 'rhe 
Court found that it was indeed prejudicial to exclude 
the testirnony, saying: 
In the present case, the (1uestion of speed was 
vital in the determination of the issue of negli-
gence. It was also highly controverted. The de-
fendant-driver testified to the speed at which he 
was traveling as he approached the vicinity of 
point A, and as to what occurred thereafter. The 
police officer testified from his diagram recon-
structing the progress of the car from point A, 
which was admitted in evidence, that the speed 
was excessive. The evidence of the physical facts 
was before the jury. Based upon those facts and 
upon the testimony of the police officer, we think 
the opinion of the expert as to his estimate of the 
speed and how he arrived thereat was relevant 
and admissible, leaving it to the jury to decide 
what weight, if any, was to be given to the testi-
mony. Reid v Brown, 5G N.M. G5, 240 P2d 213. 
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Whether a witm•ss is qualified to testify as an 
expert is a matter addre::osed to the <liserdion of 
the trial court. Land<·rs v Akhi::oon, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway Co., GS N.l\l. 130, 359 P2d 522; 
Alford v Drum, GS N.l\l. 298, 3Gl P2d -151. 
The issue of speed of thL• n's1wctive vehicles in the 
MacShara case was a crucial question, as was the issue of 
speed in any of the ca::oes cited above. Captain Foulger 
was eminently qualifiL•d to give an ovinion and had he 
been permitkd he would have kstified in accordance with 
the Offer of Proof (Tr. 286-289), that the plaintiff's ve-
hicle was not driving in excess of the sp<,ed limit and that 
the defendant's vehicle was driving substantially in ex-
cess thereof, that in fact the defrndant's car entered the 
intersection subsequent to the plaintiff's. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff \ms l'ntitled to have 
this testimony in the record as a part of his case in 
ehief, as well as in rebuttal, to overcome the contention 
of the defendant that the action was caused solely by 
reason of the excessive rate of speed of the plaintiff him-
self. 'rhe sole reason for the velwment objections of the 
defendant was because he knew that the plaintiff had no 
actual recollection of the facts of th(' accident by reason 
of his concussion and thL· retrograde amnesia, and that 
the plaintiff's passengPr had no opinion as to speed. The 
only basis or way that the plaintiff could show that h(' 
was in fact operating within the spt>ed limit and with 
due care was Captain Foulger's kstimony. This he was 
refused permission to give by the trial court. In so re-
fusing the trial court prevented the plaintiff from having 
all of his case before the .Jury and prevented the plaintiff 
from having a fair trial. This Supreme Comt of Utah 
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has hdd that a l>L·rson is dqH"iwd of a fair trial if exvert 
t\•:.; l i mon)· were improperly admitted. So it is, as night 
follo\Ys day, that a person is dqJl'ived of a fair trial if 
1•x1w1t t(•stimony is not alle\\·ed, and that as a conse-
' Jlll'll('l' the plaintiff herein was deprived of his day in 
<·ourt. 
POINT II. 
UJ.;I<'LT~ING TO l.Kt-i'L'RUCT THI~ .JURY ON THE 
J:FF'ECT OF lU~THOURADE A~.1XE81A OJ<' THE 
Pl,AINTIFF. 
Tlw plaintiff, Uary l\la('8hara, was unable to be of 
any assistance to himself as to the ddails of the accident. 
ln the opinion of Dr. Richard Iverson this failure was 
oc('ac>ioned hy a corn:ussion which he received in the 
aeeident, which caused the plaintiff to suffer retrograde 
amnesia. The opinion of Dr. Iverson was in no way con-
tiwlicted, dt•nied or impeached. 
'l'lH• 8upreme Court of Utah has heretofon' had oc-
<'asion to examine the admissibility of expert testimony 
from psychiatrists and in Lenwn v The Denver & Rio 
Grande West em Railroad Company, 9 Utah 2d 195, 341 
1':2d :215, considered the qrn·stion in detail and held that 
tlw testimony was properly admitted. Thereafter in 
Erru1s c Butters, 399 P2d 210, 16 l't 2d 272, the Court 
had before it a problem involving retrograde amn<'sia. 
'L'hp trial Court granted a n01Hmit at the conclusion of 
plaintiff':::; tP:::;timony, notwithstanding the fact that com-
peh·nt rnl'dieal evidenee existed in favor of the plaintiff 
of retrogradP amnesia. The Court reversed this decision 
and sPnt it back for rn~w trial. 
lt is our opinion that if this is done, a jury might 
l"airl)' and reasonably believe that she was unable 
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to rememlwr what happened for an appreciable 
interval jm;t prior to being stnwk by the defen-
dant's car. If the jury should w conclude, the 
plaintiff would then he aided by the recogniied 
rule that, "vVhere the loss of memory**'" render-
ing the survivor of an accident incapable of testi-
fying as to the accident is shown to be attributable 
to such accident, it ·will be presumed, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrarv that he exerci8ed . ' 
due care." 
The Ewan case is almost identical to the MacShara ca:se. 
rrhere were no eye witnesses. '11he plaintiff was unable to 
assist himself or give his interpretation of the facts be-
cause he had no interpretation. '11he only witnesses were 
the persons in defendant's vehicle. There would be no 
purpose in sumitting these facts to a Jury and what they 
could or could not find as a conse<1nence thereof. This 
problem is further discussed in Schult.z & Li11dsay Con-
struction Company v. Erickson, 352 F2d 425 (1965) 
wherein the plaintiff suffered retrograde amnesia as a 
result of injuries sustained when a bridge girder upon 
which he was sitting came loose and fell. There were 
witnesses, however the Court found that it was question-
able whether the witnesses had had sufficient time to 
observe whether or not the plaintiff 1rns exercising due 
care before and at the time of the accident. The Court 
disposd of this question by saying: 
vVe have determined, supra, that the evidence sup· 
ports a finding that the east beam splice faikd be-
cause of some negligent movement of appellants' 
crane. In view of this permissible finding of negli-
gence, the important question the jury was also re-
t1uired to resolve was ·whether the appellee was 
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in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety 
in the few seconds just prior to, and during, the 
actual breaking of the splice. W c have carefully 
scrutinized the record, but have been unable to 
find even one eye witness to appellee's conduct 
during those important moments. Therefore, the 
appellee was entitled to have the jury instructed 
on the presumption. See Cameron v. Great North-
Prn Ry. Co., 8 N.D. 124, 77 N. W. 1016 (1898); 
Rober v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 25 N.D. 394, 142 
N.W. 22 (1913) Smith v. Knutson, supra. 
Appellants also complain because, under the in-
struction, the jury was permitted to consider the 
presumption as evidence. The question whether 
to instruct on presumptions and, if so, how to in-
struct on them has long been a troublesome one, 
rearding which of the courts in the various states 
are not in unanimity. For more detailed discus-
sion of the problem, see McCormick, On Evidence 
314, 315, 316, 317 (1954). It is well settled in North 
Dakota that, in the absence of an eye witness, the 
presumption of ordinary care is properly submit-
ted to the jury. However, the cases do not clearly 
delineate whether the presumption is submissible 
to the jury as "evidence". See Cameron v. Great 
Northern Ry. Co., supra; Rober v. Northern Pac. 
Ry. Co., supra; Smith v. Knutson, supra; Quam 
V. vV engert, supra. It is the function of federal 
courts to interpret and apply, rather than to from-
ulate and establish, state law. In diversity cases 
where, as here, the highest state tribunal has not 
definitely decided a legal issue, we attempt to de-
tennine how that court would decide the matter. 
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keeping in mind the a11vlicahle standards for re-
view we are of the opinion that Judge Register 
permissibly concluded that the North Dakota 
courts would submi1t the presumption as a forrn 
of evidence. Furthermore, in the absc11ce of any 
witnesses to appellec's conduct at the crucia.Z time 
' we fail to perceive how prejudicial error could 
have res11lted from, the sulnnission of the instruc-
tion. (Italics added) 
The Comt a1Jproved the instruction of the trial court 
as follows: 
'If you find that the plainttiff in this ca:::;e, as a 
result of the accident in question, suffered a loss 
of memory so as to be unable to testify as to hio 
conduct at the time of and immediately prececling 
the accident here in question, then I instruct you 
that the law presumes the plaintiff, in his conduct 
at the time of and inuuediately preceding the acci-
dent was exercising ordinary care.' 
Obviously, the fact of the existence of a legal presump-
tion means nothing to a layman jury not versed in the 
law. The legal presumpti!on that existed in favor of .Mac-
Shara is as meaningless to a jury as would the testimony 
have been in the Ewan case without an appropriate in-
struc6on, or as it would in Schultz and Lindsay Construc-
tion without an appropriate instruction. The plaintiff 
submitted an instruction, as based on J.I.F.U. as follows: 
Based upon the commonly known fact that the 
instinct for self preservation is such that iwrsons 
use ordinary and reasonable care for their own 
safety, if y~u find that Gary l\facShara suffered 
20 
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a lm;s of memory rendering him incapable o.f 
testifying as to the details of the accident and thl• 
time immediately prior thereto, and you find 
that such loss of memory is attributable to such 
accident, you will presume that Gary MacShara 
did exercise due care for his own safety and was 
not negligent unless you are persuaded from a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was guilty 
of contributory negligence as elsewhere in these 
instructions defined. 
lt was not given by the Court, nor was any other instruc-
tion that attempted or proposed to attempt to advise the 
jury as to l\IacShara's rights with regards to that testi-
mony. 
Just as Ewan was sent back for a new trial Mac-
Shara is entitled to a new trial with appropriate instruc-
tiom; relating thereto. 
POINT III 
HEF'USJNG TO GIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
1 'TAH 21.10, 21.12, 21.14, 21.16, 16.10 and 16.12 and IN 
GIYING ITS INSTRUCTIONS 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
'L'he law in Utah is so well established by so many 
ra8es as to require no citation, that a party to litigation 
is entitled to have the jury instructed upon his theory of 
the case. The statutory law of the State of Utah, as pro-
vided in .U-6-72 states : 
(a) When two vehicles enter a-n intersection 
from two different highways at the same time the 
driver o.f the vehicle on the left shall yield the 
right of way to the vehicle on the right. 
.'.\lr. MacShara's case was based upon this fact that 
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the defendant had not yielded the right of way to him, he 
being the driver on the right of an open intersection. The 
duty to yield has been set forth in J lFU 21.10 on the 
basis of law laid down in M.artin v. Stevens, 121 Utah ±84, 
243 P2d 747. The plaintiff requested that this instruction 
be given, to-wit Plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 7. 
Notwithstanding that, the Court refused to give such 
instruction. It failed to give a comparable instruction 
thereto. 
( b) Similarly the plaintiff requested the Court to 
give JIFU Instruction 21.12. This likewise was based 
upon Utah Law, French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., l1i 
Utah 406, 216 P2d 1002; Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 
275 P2d 680. The instruction is substantially as BAJ! 
150-F. Again the Court refused to give such instruction, 
proposed plaintiff's instrnction No. 8, and did not at-
tempt or propose to attempt to instruct the Jury on the 
duty of the defendant to yield the right of way. 
( c) Plaintiff submitted his proposed Jury Instruct-
ion 9 which was identical to JIFU Instruction 21.16. 
The Court refused to give plaintiff's proposed instruct-
ion and it failed to advise the jury that a failure to 
yield constituted negligence. 
The plaintiff based his defense in part to the de-
fendant's claim of contributory n e g 1 i g e n c e on the 
fact that he had a right to assume that a car approaching 
from the left would yield the right of way and that as-
sumption continued until in the exercise of ordinary rea-
sonable care he knew, or should know, that the person 
approaching on the left was not going to yield the right 
of way. Utah law is in entire accord with the law through-
out the country, that the driver approaching on the 
22 
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right ha:,; thi:,; privilege and may expect that the driver 
on the left will yield to him. Bryant v. Bingham State, 
:208 P. 5-U, 60 Ut. 299. Ferguson v. Reynolds, 176 P. 279, 
5:2 Ut. 583. Again the plaintiff tendered, in the exact 
lJhra:,;eology contained in JIFU Instruction 16.10 and 
10.12. They are substantially identical to the BAJI in-
8trnction. The Court refused to grant these instructions, 
to-wit: Plaintiff's proposed instructions 5 and 6, and the 
Court nowhere in its instructions so advised the jury a:,; 
to the law on these points. 
As a result of the refusal of the Court to grant the:,;e 
in:,;huctions the Court as a matter of law repudiated the 
e:,;tabli:,;hed case law of the State of Utah as laid down 
hy the Supreme Court. It completely nullified the value 
of Gtah Jury instructions together with the fact that 
the :,;ame instructions were compiled by a justice of this 
Court, approved by the Utah Bar Association and rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Even more devastating as far as this plaintiff was con-
el~rned is that he was required to go before the Jury 
without having that jury advised of the law regarding 
his theo·ry of the case, thereby depriving the plaintiff 
of his right to a fair trial. The actions of the court in so 
refusing to instruct constitutes error. 
(d) 'l'he trial court in the case of Cook v. DeVine, 
:279 P:2d 1073, found that it was error to have repetitious 
instruction in favor o.f one party or against the other. 
ii evertheless an examination of the Court's Instructions 
8, 9, 10 and 11 violate that rule, in that they are in sub-
stanet> and effect duplications, one of the other, and at 
nowhere do these provide or state contrary to Bryant 
1. Ei11ghwn Stage, 208 P. 541; Ferguson v. Reynolds, 
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17G P. 279; Jll.artin v. Stci·e11soll, 2-1-3 P.2u 7-±7; Coombs 
v. Peery, 275 P.2d G80; Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation 
Company, 147 P2d 875, that a person can assume that 
another party will yield the right of way or come to a 
stop and that such a person can persist in such belief un-
til he knows, or should know, in the exercise of ordinan 
care, that this duty is about to be breached. It is sub-
mitted that the Court was further in error in the giving 
of these duplicitas instructions. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERJl.II'l'TING TESTI-
MONY OF WITNESS AS TO SPE.ED OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AT A POINT AND TIME PRIOR TO 
THE kCCIDENT. 
The record discloses that there was no independent 
witness as to the speed of either vehicle at or aboul 
the time of the accident. The defendant predicates hif 
claim of excessive speed on the part of the plaintiff on 
the basis of his own testimony and the testimony of hi1 
wife. He attempted to corroborate this testimony by 
the testimony of witnesses who allegedly saw the plain· 
tiff driving at some time or times prior to the accident 
It is established law that where there is independent 
evidence concerning the speed of a vehicle at the seem 
of the accident the 'Court may admit testimony concern· 
ing the speed o.f the vehicle at various points before ii 
reached the scene of the accident to corroborate the evi· 
dence of speed at the scene. Comins v. Scrivener, 211 
F2d 810, 46 ALR 2d 1. There was no such independent 
evidence here. The trial court permitted the evidenc1 
to corroborate the defendant himself. The important 
facts affecting the admissibility of evidence concemini 
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a driver's condition before reaching the scene of the 
accident is the fact of probability that the condition 
continued until the accident occurrred. As is said in 
S American Jurisprudence, Automobile, Section 950. 
Cc•rtain types of conduct can be changed quickly, 
so that evidence of such conduct at one point can 
have little independent value as proof of the same 
conduct at a different time and place. Other types 
of conduct, or their causes, are apt to continue 
for a substantial time, so that evidence that there 
was such conduct at a certain time and place car-
ries a likelihood that the same conduct continued 
one or more miles and one or more minutes from 
the time and place that the condnct was observed. 
Because of these and other considerations it is 
stated that the question of remoteness depends to 
a great degree upon the facts of the particular 
case, and the question whether the testimony as to 
the manner of driving before reaching the scene 
of the accident is admissible or should be excluded 
on the ground of remoteness rests in the discre-
tion o·f the trial court. Nevertheless, the rule or 
policy in some jurisdictions is to admit testimony 
which seems to have some relevancy, and to leave 
the question of weight of the tesetimony to the jury 
Under those decisions where it is charged that one 
of the parties was drunk or was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquors at the time an accident occurred, 
the court may admit testimony as to the manner in which 
such i1arty was driving his motor vehicle a substantial 
distance from the place of the accident for the purpose of 
whstantiating the charge. State v. Neville, 228 Iowa 1225, 
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293, N.W. 5GU; Wc/J!J c. Adams, 302 Ky. :35:-i, 19-t t1.W. 2d 
515. However, the testimony of a witness concerning the 
speed of a motor vehicle at a n'mott' point is no.t adrni~s­
ible to prove or corroborate evidence of speed at the 
scene of the accident unless this or souw other witnes~ 
can testify that the speed continued up to or very elo~t 
to the point of where the accident occurred. Morris r. 
Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 73 Ariz. 390, 242 P2d 279: 
Douglas v. Tu·cntcr, 3G± 1\Io. 71, 259 t1.W. 2d 353; Ries r. 
Cheyenne Cab & Transfer Co., 53 Wyo. 10±, 79 P.2d -16S. 
No witnesses so attempted to kstify, on the contrary, the 
passenger of tlw plaintiff kstified that the~- stopped at 
the Trinity Presbyterian Church at a time subesquent to 
the time of defendant's proposed \vithnesses' testimonieo. 
It was established that this stop \\'as within some 68~ 
feet of the point of impact. No one testified as to seeing 
these two vehicles between the Church and the point of 
impact, nor did anyone testify as to the speed at any time 
during the time plaintiff traveled this G82 feet, except the 
defendant. If it is clearly established that at an inter-
mediate point that the vehicle stopped, or that it had 
to slow down greatly to turn a corner or avoid an obsti-
cle, this would render inadmissible testimony as to the 
speed of the vehicle at a prior time and place where it 
is offered as evidence to support speed at the time of 
the accident. O'N eal v. J( elly Pipe Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 
577, 173 P2d 685; Denton v. Midwest Dairy Product' 
Corp., 28-! 111. App. 279, 1 NE 2d 807; Corwn v. Comer, 
256 N.C. 252, 123 S.E. 2d 473; Ronning v. State, 184 Wis. 
()51, 200 N.vV. 394. Notwithstanding the vehement ob-
jections of the counsel for the plaintiff the Court allowed 
this testimony to be introducPd as to the s1wed of thr· 
plaintiff's vehiclt> at a vlace subsequent to thP stop and 
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at a <listance substantially greater than G82 feet from 
t!H' point of impact. The two then claimed that thi:; 
proved that the plaintiff was speeding at the time o.f 
impact. The sum total of this was to the effect that the 
Court rf'fused to permit the plaintiff, as has heretofore 
been argued, and allowed defendant to introduce im-
vroper testimony that he was speeding contrary to estab-
lished law. 
POINT V 
THE COUR'l' ERRED IN PERMITING THE TESTI-
.\lONY OF THE WITNESS WHOSE NAME WAS 
NOT PROVIDED THE PLAINTIFF PRIOR 'l'O 
TRIAL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER. 
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the testimony 
of Gordon ~IcaFarland should not have been permitted 
beeause the Pre-trial Order expressly required the names 
of all witnesses be furnished opposing counsel. Mr. Wat-
kiss did not advise of Mr. McFarland's existence, let 
alone his testimony, until the day such testimony was 
offered. He stated that he would show that he himself 
was surprised and had no knowledge of such witness, 
however, the record will not show any testimony support-
ing such contention. Good cause was not shown to per-
mit the introduction of such testimony, nor was any cause 
::;hown, nor any effort made to supply this deficiency. 
CONCLUSION 
ln this case the Court refused to. permit admissible 
evidence on the part of the plaintiff as to speed of his 
vehicle and that of the defendant at the scene of the 
aceident. The trial court refused to advise the Jury as to 
tlw presumption of due care occasioned by the fact that 
27 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
i 
he was a victim of retrograde amnesia. The trial com1I 
refused to give plaintiff's requested instructions or wl 
in any way advise the jury as to the law on plaintimt 
theory of the case. The court permitted the defendant tol 
introduce improper testimony as to the speed of plain.' 
tiff's vehicle and he was even allowed to produce testi. 
rnony of witnesses contrary to the Order of the Court. 
Is it any wonder that the Jury found in favor ol 
the defendant and against the plaintiff. Is it any wonder 
that the plaintiff is before this Court asking that thi~ 
court afford to him the fair trial that is guaranteed to 
him and which is necessary if he is to sustain any com-
pensation for the loss of 20% of his bodily function at 
the age of seventeen years. 
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